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Nowadays developing countries are highly attracting foreign investors especially who have food and biofuel energy 
demands. Surprisingly, the hostage country like Ethiopia, and coming in investors have similar interests. Ethiopia opened 
the door for investors laying primary objectives: to gain foreign currency, technology exchange, creating job opportunity, 
and food security. The country designed the investment policy toward drawing in investors with red carpet incentives in 
the investment policies and legal documents and transferred an earmark 7 million hectares of smallholding farmers’ land. 
However, the objectives laid above left only being paper value without bringing into effect the promises. Nevertheless, 
the government inclined its focus only on earning foreign currency encouraging the investor to export or supply their 
product to the exporter. The article explores the issue at hand with the policy implementation theories, concepts, 
approaches, government documents and other references through thoroughly reviewed literature the effects the 
smallholding farmers facing under the investment policy and incentives. The article revealed that the challenges the 
smallholders facing under investment plan is worse than their past status quo. The policy and incentives favor the 
investors than smallholders and local people; dispossessing and displacing them from their land, lacks them food security, 
unemployment, low wage and sociocultural problems which resulted in reaction against the investors, crop fields, 
companies with fierce protests and resistances. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This reviewed article objective is to study the effects the 
Ethiopian investment and its incentives have on 
smallholding farmers. The article buckles down to show 
the consequences the investment policy the government, 
donor countries and organizations alluring have on 
smallholding farmers. The favor of the policy began 
with a lot of high talk about Ethiopia’s economic 
progress in the last couple of years. Western leaders and 
media outlets were fascinated with Ethiopia's economic 
growth as the country opened her door and gave 
encouragement for the expansion of investment to 
strengthen the domestic production capacity and thereby 
accelerate the economic development of the country 
[37]. Since early 2008, the Ethiopian government has 
embarked on a process to award millions of hectares (ha) 
of land to foreign and national investors [21]. The 
government claims that these investments will allow for 
much needed foreign currency to enter into the economy 
and will contribute to long-term food security through 
the transfer of technology to small-scale farmers. 
However, the economy of Ethiopia which generates over 
one-half (56%) of the country’s GDP, 80% of the 
country’s export earning, 85% of employment is an 
agricultural based economy of which the production is 
predominantly in the hands of smallholding farmers 
relying on their hands, some rudimentary tools and the 
fickle rains (Wiggins, 2009; Financial times, 2016). A 
mere 5 percent of agricultural output comes from big 
commercial farms [9]. 
The country modified investment policy in the 
last 20 years for more than four times to increase the 
inflow of capital and speed up the transfer of technology 
into the country (Ethiopian Investment Agency [6]. 
More, the country aimed to enhance and promote the 




benefit the society by ensuring competitiveness among 
investments made by investors. The system of 
supervision and administration of investment’s 
transparency and efficiency are designed to put in place 
and ensure that the permits and incentives granted to 
investors are used for the intended purposes; attracting 
both domestic and foreign investors to flourish their 
capital, know-how and entrepreneurship in the country 
making all walks of life beneficiaries (Preamble of 
Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012). 
Most importantly, the country on the recently 
released Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 
focused primarily on creating favorable investment 
climate among others to reach certain goals between 
2011 and 2015 gearing towards ending poverty [18]. 
Within this plan, among others, bolstering smallholder 
farmers’ productivity, enhancing marketing systems, 
upgrading participation of private sector, increasing 
volume of irrigated land and curtailing amount of 
households with inadequate food were the major one. In 
addition, the major objectives of investment policy 
promulgated in the preamble of the proclamation No. 
769/2012; is to accelerate the county’s economic 
development through exploitation of natural resources of 
the country, develop domestic market, increase foreign 
exchange earnings by enhancing exports and producing 
import-substituting products locally; and create job 
opportunities. 
 Despite the government claims, the 
smallholding farmers lose their land neither enjoyed 
what they have been promised. So far they didn’t 
witness the food security or the employment after 7 
million hectares of land transferred to investors. The 
investors have food insecurity and energy demand back 
home in addition to the encouragement government gave 
them via incentives, inter alia, to export the production 
or supply to exporter.  
Accordingly, in this article the author tries to 
verify the effects the investment policy and incentives to 
investors have on smallholders and the latter’s reactions 
against the policy’s result in Ethiopia in general along 
with policy implementation concepts, theories, 
approaches based on reviewed literature. 
1. THE CONCEPT OF POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In defining the concept of policy implementation 
different scholars come up with different but similar 
ideas. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) define 
implementation in terms of a relationship to policy as 
laid down in official documents.  As cited in Paudel, 
referring to them, policy implementation may be viewed 
as a process of interaction between the setting of goals 
and actions geared to achieve them [26[. Policy 
implementation, both one-time efforts to transform 
decisions into operational terms and continuing efforts to 
achieve the large and small changes mandated by policy 
decisions, encompassing actions of public and private 
individuals or groups directed at achieving objectives set 
forth in policy decisions.Mazmanian and Sabatier (1979) 
defined policy implementation as the carrying out of a 
basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute, 
but which can also take the form of important executive 
orders or court decisions. Paudel put the authoritative 
decisions such as politicians, top-level bureaucrats, and 
others who are the most relevant to produce the desired 
effects as the starting point of policy implementation 
[24].  
As quoted in Hill and Hupe, Matland argued 
that, successful implementation, requires compliance 
with statutes’ directives and goals; achievement of 
specific success indicators; and improvement in the 
political climate around a program [10]. Compliance 
with legislation in the implementation of policy goes in 
line with the rule and due process of law.  Besides this, 
Paudel signaled that the success of a policy depends 
critically on two broad factors: local capacity and will 
[24]. The institutional capacities in carrying out the 
policy have to be established and functioned 
accordingly. Not only that, the institutions should 
perform willingly. Paudel goes on explaining the 
questions of motivation and commitment (or will) that 
they reflect the implementer’s assessment of the value of 
a policy or the appropriateness of a strategy. Motivation 
or will is influenced by factors largely beyond the reach 
of policy environmental stability; competing centers of 
authority, contending priorities or pressures and other 
aspects of socio-political milieu can also profoundly 
influence an implementer’s willingness.  
The above discussion conceptualizes 
implementation as a process, output and 
accomplishment. It is a process of a series of decisions 
and actions directed towards putting a prior authoritative 




strategy have to take into consideration the capacity of 
local people and their will. Policy designer’s final goal-
top or bottom is to make sure that community is 
benefited from the policy. At the same time the local 
people have to be consulted on the designed policy 
before taking implementation into picture to recognize 
the due process of law. The essential characteristic of 
implementation process is the timely and satisfactory 
performance of necessary tasks related to carrying out of 
the intent of the law. This best embraced if the 
community at large involved in the making and 
implementation of the policy willfully without being 
enforced from anybody. 
  
2. THEORIES OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
With the evolvement of implementation researches, 
two schools of thought developed as to the most 
effective method for studying and describing 
implementation policy: top-down and bottom-up. 
According to top-down approach, policymaker set 
certain goals and implementation is carried out by 
setting up certain mechanisms (Palumbo, D.J and 
Calista, 1990). The top-down view a highly prescriptive 
bent making policy goals clear and consistent, minimize 
the number of actors, limit the extent of change 
necessary and place implementation responsibility in an 
agency sympathetic with the policy's goals. This 
perspective describes the investment policy of Ethiopia 
as the later clearly sets policy objectives in its statutory 
and documents (Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012; 
EIA, 2014; MOFED, 2010; GTP 2010/11 – 2014/15), 
directly designed and adopted by top level officials 
without consulting the local communities and 
smallholders [21], taking control of the land from 
several regional government through the creation of the 
federal land bank, enforcing locals for the 
implementation and when face resistance use military 
force [21] The top officials focused on political 
decision-law- and punish whoever dissented or opposed 
the policy in the name of anti-development. Matland 
underlined that top-down approach theorist taking 
statutory language from the beginning fails them to 
consider the significance of actions taken in the policy-
making process [11].  
The Ethiopian investment policy and incentives 
concentration on generating foreign currency through 
encouraging investors on exporting their production fails 
them to consider broader smallholders need and public 
interest [3, 34] It gave less protection to smallholders 
and local people than investors. The investment policy 
and incentives being opened door policy has clear, 
explicit, and consistent goals on transferring such huge 
land to investors with red carpet incentives contradicts 
much of what is known about how this legislation is 
passed with its rational background. This inevitably 
leads us to look at the formation of the current Ethiopian 
government and who is the main political power holder 
and policy maker. The country’s government and power 
sharing system must be taken into consideration. The 
country’s government and power sharing discussion 
necessitated for it goes with what Hill and Hupe 
said,“policy is made as it is being administered and 
administered as it is being mad [10]. Accordingly, 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)1 assumed 
leadership and still dominates national politics in 
Ethiopia. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF)2, which is made up of four 
major ethnic groups (Oromo, Amhara, Tigray and 
Southern Nation, Nationalities and People) pretends to 
have the power in the country, is seen as little more than 
a puppet of TPLF. Most of the ethnic group 
organizations “in power” were fabricated over night by 
TPLF in 1991 on their arrival to the capital-Finfinne 
(Addis Ababa)-with the intention of convincing the 
international community that all ethnic groups are 
represented [2]. The preferential treatment that Tigrayan 
investors seem to get when it comes to investment; 
getting land freely, and receive preferential access to 
credit shows the clear intention of the policy and 
incentives and its being top-down.Consequently, 75 
percent of domestic investors in Gambella3 were from 
Tigray  [20]. On the other hand, bottom-up theoretic 
approaches argue that a more realistic understanding of 
implementation can be gained by looking at a policy 
from the view of the target population and the service 
																																								 																				
1. A political party in Tigray region and currently the 
influential leader of Ethiopian government.  
2.The ruling political coalition in Ethiopia. The front consists 
of four political parties; the Oromo People’s Democratic 
Organisation (OPDO), Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), the southern Ethiopian people’s 
democratic Movement (SEPDM) and the Tigrayan People’s 
Liberation Front.  
3. Gambela Peoples' Region, is one of the nine ethnic 
divisions of Ethiopia. Previously known as "Region 12", its 




deliverer. According to this approach the policy 
implementation occurs on two levels-macro and micro 
implementation[4]. The central government devises the 
program; local organizations react to macro level plans, 
develop their own programs, and implement them. 
However, we don’t witness such interactions in the case 
of Ethiopia as the smallholders and local communities 
have neither invited nor entitled to react on the designed 
policy and come up with their own programs for the 
implementation. The farmers and local community were 
not consented on the policy and not parcel of the 
program [27,15,2]. The street level bureaucrats only 
made to run the implementation without taking part in 
designing their programs of implementation. Instead the 
federal government designs the policy and then directly 
influences the locals and street level bureaucrats for the 
policy implementation up to using mighty military 
[2,15]. In addition, conditions, according to the bottom-
uppers if local level implementers are not given the 
freedom to adapt the program to local conditions it will 
fail [22]. Local communities and smallholders have 
already started protesting and resisting the policy after 
witnessing its effects and the promise didn’t happen. 
Smallholders problems, activities and contacts have to 
be asked to map a network that identify the relevant 
implementation structure of investment policy at local, 
regional and national levels and to evaluate the 
significance of investment policy and incentives with 
other influences. 
 
3. ETHIOPIAN INVESTMENT POLICY AND 
INCENTIVES 
The policy and conditions of leasing land to both 
foreign and domestic investors for commercial farming 
is labeled as “open door” as it is highly favorable to 
investors and does little to protect the environment and 
the rights of local people (Oakland Institute, 2011; 
Rahmato, 2011). In Ethiopia land is state owned 
property (FDRE4 Constitution article 40/3). However, 
under the investment policy the investors privileged 
more than lease right. One Indian investor claimed 
“…land is state property but government gives the rights 
by way of leases which are transferable, are renewable, 
which are pledgeable, in a lot of ways leases are 
tantamount to near ownership” ( Quoted in Oakland 
																																								 																				
4. The Ethiopian state nomenclature, Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 
Institute, 2011). The policy opened the door to the extent 
that the government made purely commercial agreement 
with investor charging them only a dirt cheap rent. What 
they choose to do on the land for their own commercial 
intent is their own business. There are no governance, no 
constraints, no contracts, none of that between 
government or smallholders and investors [21]. It is 
obvious that in the absence of no governance, no 
constraints, and no contracts the smallholders would be 
driven into sea by both investors and policy of 
government. For the smallholders, it is difficult to stand 
with the challenges that would follow after they transfer 
the only thing they have-land! The government wants to 
see investment and then expects the advantage to be 
more than the land rent. The Ethiopian government 
claims that these investments will allow for much 
needed foreign currency to enter into the economy and 
will contribute to long-term food security through the 
transfer of technology to small-scale farmers. In the 
contrary, the investors that have given large-scale of 
land-the government is focusing on, have energy and 
food security interests which made difficult for the 
government to realize its objective of eradicating 
poverty out of his own population [15]. The investors 
are export oriented and investment policy and incentives 
intended to generate income from export and then satisfy 
food demand by purchasing; of which ischallenging and 
implausible to please locals’, smallholders’ or the whole 
communities’ food insecurity. 
Surprisingly, investment policy and incentives 
set free investors from requiring them to improve local 
food security conditions or to make production available 
for local population in any lease agreement. More, 
despite Ethiopia’s endemic poverty, there are no 
mechanisms in place to ensure that these investments 
contribute to improve food security for smallholders and 
local communities. Nevertheless, numerous incentives 
assured food production for export to provide foreign 
exchange for the country at the expense of local food 
supplies.  
New investment proclamation also provides a 
number of incentives to potential investors in different 
forms. Starting from minimizing the capital requirement 
for a single investment up to the highest tax exemption 
period-8 to 9 year-to investors engaged in forest 
development (Investment Proc. No. 769/2012; 
Regulation No. 270/2012). Foreign investors are also 




acquired from their investment in convertible foreign 
currency (Article, 26). Investment regulation No. 
270/2012 provides more details of the privileges given 
to foreign investors. In the detailed income tax 
exemption section, the Regulation states that investors 
engaged in agricultural investment outside of Finfinne 
(Addis Ababa)5 and Oromia6 Special Zone7 Surrounding 
Finfinne are entitled to 3-5 years of income tax holiday. 
The agricultural investment investors do in Finfinne 
(Addis Ababa) and the regulation is trying to give tax 
privilege is quite not clear as big agricultural investment 
in the capital may not be expected. Income tax 
exemption for an investor for almost for a decade would 
possibly made the country to lose the revenue supposed 
to be collected and thereby used for the wellbeing of the 
country.  
As provided in article 5 of the same 
proclamation, an income tax deduction of 30% for 3 
years after the expiry of the former exemption period are 
given to encourage any potential investors to engage in 
the least developed and relatively low population density 
regions who establish a new investment venture. 
Investors are also allowed to import duty free capital 
goods and construction materials for new investment 
venture and for expansion (Article, 13). Moreover, 
investors who export or supply to an exporter at least 
60% of their products or service input are entitled to 
have 2 more years of income tax exemption (Article, 7). 
As raised above, from the very beginning investors have 
food and energy interest back home; added with 
incentives encouragement to export or supply to exporter 
their products or services left smallholders and local 
communities with food insecurity and promises unkept. 
Incentives coupled with global demand for farmland is 
expected to bring more investors eager to engage in 
large-scale farming at the expense of smallholding 
farmers.  
Such a high incentives have effect both on the 
present and future benefits of the country and people. 
The above incentives highly inclined the investors to 
produce for export or supply to an exporter. Export 
oriented investment with tax privilege plausibly leave 
																																								 																				
5 . Finfinne or Addis Ababa is the current capital city of 
Ethiopia  
6 . Oromia is the single largest region in Ethiopia  
7 .OromiaSpecial ZoneSurrounding Finfinne is one of the 
zones of the Oromia Region in Ethiopia surrounding the 
capital  
the bare smallholders in dilemma of food insecurity, 
technological and economic advancement as the 
investors produce and ship out of the country, no tax and 
revenue is levied on what they import and export, hiring 
and firing workers is up to the investors, doing whatever 
they [investors] pleased on the leased land is their 
business, nothing is put in place in the lease contract to 
protect the interest of smallholders and local people, and 
assuming just to satisfy local needs and country’s 
demand with the foreign currency will not help to 
forward and change the nations or smallholders life. 
Giving incentives for the investors to come in to 
flourish their capital may seem normal in the eyes of 
investment policy implementation. However, the author 
agrees with the permits and balanced incentives granted 
to investors so long as they used for the intended 
purposes. Preserve the interests of smallholders and 
local communities, protect the environment, the ecology 
and culture, values and customs of the society, kept the 
promises, supported with plausible contract, integrate 
the local capacity and their wills, consultation and 
mechanisms to include them have to be set in advance. 
Otherwise its implication exceeds the benefits resulting 
in corruption, land grab, discrimination, protests, 
resistance, favoring one ethnic group which dominates 
the political power as the case of Tigrean investors in 
Gambella region. This would turn back the country into 
conflict, chaos, and destitute poverty if smallholders and 
local communities haven’t seen themselves in the 
incentivized project running on their commercialized 
land and area.  
4. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE  
Wage rates for smallholding farmers and locals 
hired in investment projects especially agricultural labor 
are low just 2/3 of what the smallholders working in the 
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) are earning [2].  
While some of those employed are local, the majority of 
laborers were from different places resulting in conflict 
with the local. The investors pay low and don’t care for 
the locals because according to investment policy it is up 
to the investor, who to hire [21].  In addition, the vast 
majority of projected employment figures involve large 
numbers of seasonal workers, to be employed during 
labor-intensive periods in the production cycle 
(harvesting, etc.). More, there is no employment security 
nor any means of wage upgrading for smallholders and 
local people hired in the project based on experience 




Investment policy’s target is supposed to create 
job opportunities and thereby make the smallholders 
beneficiary from the salary they earn. However, the 
wage they paid couldn’t even live them on hand to 
mouth. At the policy-making process the targeted group 
were not taken into consideration, the real problem they 
face were not researched well, no guidance were 
included for investors how to treat smallholders and 
local communities in the lease contract. Comparing the 
life they were living before their land were taken and 
under investor made the smallholders and local 
communities to resist and protest the investment despite 
the government trying to protect investors’ interest with 
mighty military. Concentrating on the statutory 
language, foreign currency inflow from export 
government fails to consider broader public objectives 
and the main reason for granting incentives in the policy 
implementation.   
5. FOOD SECURITY 
Since the fertile land are prime land investment 
areas because of ample water supplies and good soil 
fertility are already commercialized through the federal 
land bank, the area became the most food insecure 
though those areas weren’t exposed to food insecurity 
before the investors came in (Oakland Institute, 2011). 
The wage labor they got even could not help them to 
afford food as the policy of the government encourages 
food production for export, the investors either shipped 
or sold at the market it pleases resulting in food price 
rise. The policy of investment and the incentives is 
among the underlying causes for food insecurity of 
smallholding particularly in the areas of intensive land 
investment [21]. Policy-formation process gives 
implementers important cues about intensity of 
demands, and about the size, stability, and degree of 
consensus among those pushing for change. 
Nevertheless, the policy gave deaf ear to the high 
demand of the smallholders although the government 
document boldly underline ensuring food security as its 
primary objectives in pleading investors to come in the 
country.  
Previously, these households were largely self-
sufficient with respect to food production. Now they will 
have to rely on assistance from others and will become 
more dependent on handouts from the government. 
Change in diet, loss of traditional lands, increased 
reliance on wage employment and aid, and weakened 
community bonds will also result from this livelihood 
loss. The Oakland Institute came with a conclusion that, 
the adverse effect of investment policy’s 
commercializing land on the lives of local people will be 
dramatic, long term, and potentially irreversible [21]. 
 
6. SOCIOCULTURAL EFFECTS 
As the investment policy’s objective is to create 
job opportunity, it resulted in massive influxes of 
laborers come from other areas of the country which 
have significant adverse effects on local communities 
and smallholders whose land is commercialized. These 
include: increased deforestation, decline in fish, wildlife, 
and other resources in the immediate area, conflict with 
local people, higher incidences of sexual assault, greater 
pressure on infrastructure, increase in prostitution (and 
subsequent spread of HIV and other STDs) and greater 
stresses on ecological systems (including water 
resources), cultural shock, unaccustomed to the local 
people life style [21]. 
Sociocultural effect happened because land is 
not only a fixed asset essential to produce sufficient 
amount of crop and animal to secure supply of food, but 
it is the foundation of identities (language, culture, & 
history) of communities living on the land. So far 
nothing is done from both sides-government and 
investors, in preserving the identity of smallholders and 
local communities whose land are commercialized. The 
government seeks foreign exchange while the investors 
slurping their profits using the red carpet opportunity 
created by the formers policy and incentives. Since the 
investors are guaranteed with the right who to hire, and 
what and how to do on the land; they don’t bother for 
the local peoples’ identity. This is one defect of the post-
modern theory; ignoring believes, culture, values and 
identity of the society. On the other hand, postmodern 
theory gives more power to people through 
decentralization. However, on the issue at hand the 
policy making process and implementation deprived the 
power of local community and smallholders enforcing 
them to implement the policy top-downed. This brought 
adverse effect on practicing democratic principles and 
building developmental democratic state as government 
called itself. Since Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic and ruled 
by ethnic based federalism ignoring the assets of the 






7. DISPOSSESSING AND DISPLACING THE 
SMALLHOLDERS 
Recent research shows that government’s 
dispossessing and displacing smallholders and local 
communities under the guide of investment policy and 
development have adverse effect on smallholders. 
Anderson and et al signaled the dangers and its effects in 
natural resource degradation, loss of indigenous farming 
practices, food insecurities, conflicts, neglects local 
rights, exploits natural resources and impoverishes 
farmers by not bringing about the promised benefits 
(Andersen & Robertson,2010, Theting & Brekke, 2010; 
Kachika, 2010; Grain, 2008). Land certification and 
registration could notprevent public authorities from 
expropriating land and natural resources as the 
smallholder farmers have a weak, limited, conditional 
and subject to abrogationland right, at any time,in the 
name of investment policy the country adopted [2].  
Most importantly, smallholders are dispossessed 
with inadequate, unfair compensation or not at all and 
displaced from to another area (Ramhato, 2011; Theting 
& Brekke, 2010). In the contrary, the compensation 
requirements are clearly stated in Ethiopian 
Proclamation No. 455/2005 outlining the procedures 
including the advance payment of compensation 
equivalent to the replacement cost of property on the 
land and any improvements (value of capital and labor) 
made to the land. In addition, displaced persons should 
receive 10 times their average annual income from the 
previous 5 years. Despite the favor of the law, to some 
extent, for adequate, fair and prompt compensation,the 
smallholders paid a minimum compensation or not at all 
for their land. Under investment coverage the 
government agents, brokers, including the investor uses 
smallholding farmer’s land changing it into capital. In 
fact, both federal and regional governments are directly 
or indirectly behind the “land grabbing” (Kachika, 
2010). In Legetafo, Oromia region, the smallholding 
farmer was paid 17 birr ($0.80) a square meter in 
compensationwhile people were bidding as much as 
355,555 birr ($ 16,732) per square meter to rent land in 
in the capital (William D., 2016). While the land should 
be used at global, national and local levels efficiently 
taking into account all functions and making the entire 
population’s long term interest stronger than the short-
term interests of certain privileged groups (UN, 2002). 
The research conducted by Oakland Institute 
showsThe Displacement Case of Gambella8 and 
Benishangul9. Oakland Institute10 revealed that, all 
indigenous peoples in Gambella and Benishangul 
(approximately 45,000 households in Gambella and 
90,000 households in Benishangul) were relocated from 
their ancestral lands to small villages of 400-500 
households. The relocations are involuntary, if villagers 
did not move; the federal police would come and arrest 
them.  
8. SMALLHOLDERS AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES REACTION 
The smallholders and communities protested and 
resisted the policy not just because they have been 
displaced, evicted from their lands or were being 
threatened with displacement or eviction, but also 
because of the marginalization of identity-language, 
culture, history, denied employment opportunities and 
non fulfillment of other promises that investments were 
purported to bring [19]. On the other hand, the different 
ethnic nations under the effects of the investment policy 
and its incentives claim their land as a backbone since it 
is the only thing they have. As quoted in Moreda, studies 
conducted so far in the country related to the issue, 
though limited, show that adverse implications have 
already occurred to these indigenous communities and 
their environment and contend that this will likely 
worsen further in the future (e.g., Rahmato 2011, 
Kelbessa et al. 2009, Shete 2011, Fisseha 2011, Lavers 
2012b). The local communities of different ethnic 
groups including the Oromo and Amhara who have 
faced land alienation or are being threatened by 
displacement or eviction as a result of current 
investment policies engaged in different forms of 
resistance in order to maintain their socio-cultural 
identities, self-administration, and economies (Walker 
2008; Malseed 2008).  
The ways in which smallholders and local 
communities of Oromo, Gumuz, Gambella, Amhara, 
Gedeo, Sidama have been reacting to the effects of the 
investments policies and incentives was peaceful and 
																																								 																				
8 . Also officially known as Gambela Peoples' Region, is one 
of the nine ethnic divisions of Ethiopia 
9 .Also known as Benshangul/Gumaz, is one of the nine 
ethnic divisions of Ethiopia 
10 . The Oakland Institute is a policy think tank dedicated to 
advancing public participation and fair debate on critical 




later changed into conflict following the brutal 
crackdown of state. They reflected negative attitudes 
towards investors operating in their surroundings and 
several instances of covert expressions of resistance 
against them have occurred after their peaceful demand 
rejected by crackdown. Smallholders and local 
communities reacted toinflux of migrant workers, field 
crops, companies, factories and farm machineries 
warehouse belonging to the investors, state’s oppressive 
institutions like police stations, prison, court, offices and 
etc setting on fire [1]. As a result of the sabotage, 
machineries such as tractors, threshers, spare parts as 
well as many other valuable goods including factories 
and state’s oppressive institutions were destroyed.                                
 
II. CONCLUSION 
While the Proclamations and regulations proclaimed 
claimed to create transparency, make sure that the 
incentives provided used for the main objectives laid 
down,the top down policy implementation created a gap 
between smallholders and governments-what the 
smallholders and governmentwant, found on the 
opposite side. The formers need technological change, 
food security, employment, land tenure, hold their 
identity, inter alia, while the later eagerly in need of 
foreign currency resulting in encouraging investors to 
ship abroad whatever produced on the smallholders’ 
commercialized land. There are no governance; no 
constraints, no contracts, none of that to protect the 
smallholders’ interest and make investors to keep 
promises. The government wants to see investment and 
then expects the advantage to be more than the land rent 
ignoring smallholders.  
Investment policy and incentives the country 
adopted favors the foreign investors and domestic giving 
little protection to smallholders and local communities. 
The government claims that these investments will allow 
for much needed foreign currency to enter into the 
economy and will contribute to long-term food security 
through the transfer of technology to small-scale 
farmers. Instead of being beneficiaries from the 
investment policy and incentives the smallholders 
subjected to eviction, displacement, dispossession 
without or unfair compensation, losing their identity, 
marginalization, food insecurity, unemployment even if 
employed at minimum wage, unnecessary conflict, 
human right violation and etc. as both the government 
and investors didn’t keep their promises. 
Finally, the smallholders and local communities 
reacted in different tactics against the result of the 
investment policies and its incentives. They reacted to 
the investors, damaged field crops and means of 
production, resisted the immigration of seasonal 
laborers, and damaged the oppressive state’s institutions.  
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